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The future of the US nuclear arsenal continues to be guided by two distinct drivers: the 
preservation of world peace and the prevention of further proliferation through our 
extended deterrent umbrella. Timely implementation of US nuclear policy decisions 
depends, in part, on the current state of stockpile weapons, their delivery systems, and the 
supporting infrastructure within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of 
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In turn, the present is a 
product of past choices and world events. Now more than ever, the nuclear weapons 
program must respond to the changing global security environment and to increasing 
budget pressures with innovation and sound investments. As the nation transitions to a 
reduced stockpile, the successes of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) present 
options to transition to a sustainable complex better suited to stockpile size, national 
strategic goals and budgetary realities. Under any stockpile size, we must maintain 
essential human capital, forefront capabilities, and have a right-sized effective production 
capacity. We present new concepts for maintaining high confidence at low stockpile 
numbers and to effectively eliminate the reserve weapons within an optimized complex. 
We, as a nation, have choices to make on how we will achieve a credible 21st century 
deterrent. 
I. Background 
The Stockpile. Guided by national policy, the US nuclear stockpile reached a maximum 
of tens of thousands of weapons, leveled off as the strategic arms control process 
proceeded, and substantially decreased after the Cold War ended. In 2007, the 
government announced early achievement the goal to reduce the stockpile to less than 
one-quarter its size at the end of the Cold War and that it intends a further 15% reduction. 
The US retains a number of stockpile weapons over and above the number operationally 
deployed. This reserve stockpile assures sufficient units are available for destructive 
surveillance evaluation and for use as substitutes to operationally deployed weapons if a 
performance issue takes down a significant number of deployed weapons. 
During the Cold War, new nuclear designs were introduced at a rapid pace. More than 
thirty different weapon systems were deployed. Many others were developed but not 
deployed. Steady development provided opportunities to dramatically improve the safety 
and security of the US nuclear stockpile. Improvements included use control, technology 
to avoid accidental spread of nuclear materials, and command disable of weapons. 
Unfortunately, these features are not deployed on all weapons currently stockpiled. For 
example, only one of four deployed ballistic missile warheads has insensitive high 
explosive and a fire-resistant pit. 
Weapon designs met increasingly stringent military requirements, leaving some less than 
desirable characteristics in the current nuclear security environment. The limits of the 
possible were pushed. The goal was high yield-to-weight. Exotic and/or environmentally 
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difficult materials were used to reduce weight. Production involved roughly a dozen steps 
that are hard to reproduce. Long shelf life and ease of manufacture were not priorities. 
Since the end of new weapon development, the Life Extension Program (LEP) has sought 
to maintain warheads by replacing some components with newly made ones that stay as 
close to original as possible. Most Cold War nuclear weapons do not have large 
performance margins. This increases the difficulty and expense of sustaining them in 
stockpile. In the absence of nuclear testing, and we emphasize – we have been very 
successful in creating the capabilities that make it unlikely that we would need to nuclear 
test – the effects of aging or rebuilds with processes, materials, or engineering features 
different from the original design increases uncertainties that challenge confidence. In 
parallel to the LEP program, NNSA is dismantling retired nuclear warheads as rapidly as 
safe and secure operations permit. Since 1992, 13 different weapons types have been 
eliminated. Dismantlement rates increased significantly in 2007.  
The Stockpile Stewardship Program. The President announced in 1995 that we would 
pursue a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In making that decision, he reaffirmed 
the importance of a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent and created the SSP to sustain 
stockpile reliability. 
The SSP is based on the development of a detailed understanding of the science and 
technology governing nuclear weapons operation. This means that future stewards will 
have the tools to assess the performance of US nuclear weapons with confidence. They 
must be able to remake parts and rebuild weapons as needed and deal with whatever 
issues arise using a set of computational and experimental tools that excludes nuclear 
explosive tests.  
To date, the SSP has achieved remarkable successes. It has enabled the laboratory 
directors to assure the nation that we do not need to conduct a nuclear test to certify the 
deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable. Still, it is a work in progress. In 2004, the W87 
ICBM warhead was the first to be successfully LEP’d. SSP enabled the restoration of pit 
production in 2007 using new, validated processes. In 2006, after a long program of 
experiments, simulations, and analysis of previous nuclear test data, scientists concluded 
that US nuclear weapon performance would not decline sharply due to plutonium aging 
effects. Enabled by the Advanced Simulation and Computing program (ASC), many 
other advances in understanding and modeling of nuclear weapons have been made, 
settling many issues left unresolved at the end of testing. To date, the SSP has achieved 
more than $10B in LEP cost avoidance and eliminated more than $4B in pit 
manufacturing facility cost. A few overarching goals remain for the SSP. The key and 
most difficult is the development of a validated, predictive boost model that addresses 
weapon performance. Advances in high performance computing, pursuing the next 
logical steps in computer model development, and data from experimental facilities such 
as NIF and DARHT will enable this transformation to “predictive capability.” The next 
steps in the SSP, the ability to fully and accurately simulate weapons performance, will 
give decision makers confidence in certification of weapons as they deviate from their 
nuclear-tested state. 
Complex Transformation. NNSA’s plans to transform the nuclear weapons complex are 
described in a January 2008 draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact 
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Statement. The goal is to make the complex smaller, safer, more secure, and more cost 
effective while restoring its ability to make nuclear weapons. Originally, transformation 
plans hinged on the streamlined manufacturing environment enabled by RRW, however 
the future remains undecided and so we must prepare to sustain the deterrent with LEPs 
for Cold War weapons. 
II. Future Requirements for Nuclear Weapons 
We do not believe that nuclear weapons will be eliminated any time soon. For over sixty 
years nuclear weapons have preserved world peace. Some believe that advanced 
conventional weapons (ACW) will displace and eliminate nuclear weapons. We doubt 
this will happen. Today, the number of states believed to possess nuclear weapons has 
returned to its historical high of nine, but several times that have the potential to acquire 
weapons in a short period of time. About half the world’s population lives in states that 
have nuclear weapons and about three-fourths live with their own or are under the nuclear 
umbrella provided by security assurances, or at one time explored the prospect of 
acquiring their own weapons.  In the Cold War, of the more than a dozen nations that 
started developing nuclear weapons, most subsequently terminated their programs. Since 
the Cold War ended, India and Pakistan have become nuclear weapons states; North 
Korea has tested a nuclear device; and, Iran is determined to become part of the nuclear 
club. There is no correlation (or perhaps a negative correlation) between US stockpile 
size or activities and proliferation. There is likely a strong correlation between ACW and 
nuclear proliferation. Presently, over 30 nations rely on our extended nuclear deterrent. 
There is a strong relationship between ally nonproliferation and the US extended 
deterrent. Since the US ceased its nuclear testing program in September 1992, there have 
been over a dozen foreign nuclear tests. While the US does not presently have the 
capability to remanufacture its Cold War stockpile, Russia, China, the UK, and France do 
and are actively pursuing modernization of their strategic nuclear forces. 
Achieving a sustainable 21st century US nuclear deterrent is one of the main challenges 
we face. The US deterrent must continue to maintain world peace. It has been and will 
continue to be a means by which the US can convince adversaries that we have a 
capability to hold what they value at risk. This deters adversaries from using WMD 
against the US and its allies, convinces our allies they need not pursue development of 
their own nuclear force, and assures the American people, our allies, and our friends that 
we are capable of defending them against intimidation or attack. Unfortunately, as a 
nation, we have yet to agree on how to maintain the credibility of this deterrent. We are 
encouraged that the 2008 Congressional Commission on US Strategic Posture will help 
define 21st century nuclear policy and the role nuclear weapons play in meeting the 
challenges of today’s global security environment. 
The nuclear weapons laboratories offer valuable, credible, and essential advice on 
stockpile and weapons complex options. Determining US stockpile size, make up, and 
related production rates must take into account the military roles and evolving target base 
that conventional weapons cannot meet, be able to meet threats to its safety and security, 
and be survivable in light of technical advances in other nations. The arm of the deterrent 
provided by NNSA must balance risk against budget pressure, human capital against 
floor space, investments in efficient, high confidence, modern technologies against 
proven though less sustainable Cold War technologies. The laboratories are ideally suited 
  4 
to inform decision makers on the available options, advance innovative technologies to 
minimize capital investments, and explore options and quantify risks associated with 
maintaining a credible, but much smaller stockpile.  
III. Optimizing the Program to Support a Reduced Stockpile 
A sound 21st century strategic posture must be consistent with a viable stockpile and 
weapons complex. While the strategic posture has yet to be developed, it is worth 
exploring issues and innovative approaches —from a stockpile steward’s perspective—in 
making significant further reductions in the size of the US nuclear stockpile and weapons 
complex while maintaining a credible deterrent. For the purposes of argument, we 
assumed a stockpile size on the order of ~2000 warheads. However, most of these 
concepts and arguments apply as stockpile numbers approach zero. 
How to build this optimized program? Detailed plans must be designed to meet three 
overarching objectives: First, to keep the stockpile safe, secure, and reliable given the 
evolving security environment. Second, to approach elimination of any likelihood that the 
US would have to conduct a nuclear test by advancing the necessary skills, expertise, and 
tools to make sound decisions on how best to meet the first objective. Third, to retain the 
capability and sustain the minimum capacity to respond to changing international 
circumstances. The plans must meet these objectives in an affordable, sustainable way 
that is fully consistent with US national security objectives (e.g., nuclear 
nonproliferation) and international obligations (e.g., extended deterrence). 
A mature SSP—with transparent internal and external review mechanisms—is the 
foundation. Three important questions to address: What types of weapons should be 
produced? What are the long-term scientific and technical capabilities required to sustain, 
not just the stockpile, but the deterrent? What should be the capacity of the production 
complex? 
What types of weapons should be produced? life-extended, Cold War weapons vs. 
modernized, high-margin warheads. Stockpile Stewardship has enabled us to maintain 
a stockpile that is safe and, with manageable exceptions, reliable. But the risks to the 
stockpile are real. Through the stockpile surveillance program we continue to identify 
problems with warheads that in the past would have been resolved with nuclear tests. 
After more than a decade of SSP experience, we have concluded that our current path –
maintaining the certification of a high yield-to-weight, finely tuned Cold War stockpile 
through successive incremental life extension programs (iLEP) – involves increasing 
risk. Given this increasing risk, it is prudent to explore alternate means to ensure 
stockpile reliability over the long term. A stockpile based on fewer types of Cold War 
weapons also increases risk. As we have learned through hard experience, unless there is 
type diversity in the stockpile, common mode failure will have serious consequences. 
We have sought ways to mitigate that risk by increasing margin-to-failure and 
simultaneously address 21st century security threats with surety enhancements. For 
example, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is optimized for high-performance 
margin, for ease of manufacture, for eliminating hazardous materials, and to increase 
safety and security. The laboratory directors stated that, in their technical judgment, it 
would be less likely that we will need nuclear testing to maintain the safety, security, and 
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reliability of the stockpile if we pursue modern replacement warheads than if we rely on 
iLEPs of existing Cold War warheads.  
It is useful to contrast these two polar possibilities: that current Cold War weapons stay 
in the stockpile indefinitely through iLEPs that could grow more difficult over time as 
more and more parts of aging weapons need to be replaced; or that over time, modern 
high-margin technologies achieve high confidence in the enduring stockpile. Both 
approaches carry baggage. Some believe RRWs have the stigma both of being “new” 
designs and not having the benefit of fully integral nuclear tests. The LEP approach may 
very well require long-term preservation of a reserve stockpile to hedge against a quickly 
arising problem that exceeds small margins to failure. Preliminary studies indicate that the 
RRW approach should be less expensive than iLEPs because RRW is specifically 
designed with ease of manufacture, no exotic materials (save plutonium and enriched 
uranium), and smaller facilities in mind. Are we better off with a weapon that, while 
tested, has not specifically been tested as weaponized but is designed to have large 
performance margins and comparatively simple engineering features? Or, are we better off 
with a weapon with small performance margins and many design alterations from that 
tested in its original instantiation? It is clear to us that RRW provides the best path 
forward to a smaller stockpile. It will take some time for sufficient numbers of RRW to 
enter the stockpile in order to alleviate the issues presented by the iLEP approach to the 
Cold War stockpile. An intermediate, temporizing approach to this transition is needed. 
This will be even more the case absent an opportunity to explore potential RRW 
advantages because iLEPs then become the default solution. 
Fortunately, there is a temporizing measure to this dilemma if we truly are on the road to 
a substantially smaller stockpile. It involves an innovative extension to the present iLEPs. 
An extensive reuse LEP (erLEP) approach can be tailored to upgrade surety, increase 
margin, and increase system life. As with an iLEP, an erLEP would not add military 
capability, other than surety and safety. In a sense, erLEP sits in a continuum between the 
iLEP and the high-margin, high-surety RRW. It brings much benefit to the stockpile, but 
not all the benefits to all the stockpile. Not all systems can be LEP'd via this route. There 
are just not enough of the appropriate parts. The remaining Cold War weapons could be 
“cherry picked” to avoid known aging concerns. While not the ideal solution embodied in 
RRW, this temporizing method can better life extend Cold War weapons and avoid many 
large investments. 
A very large number of components from nuclear-tested designs sit in storage, either 
separated from weapons or integral to weapons slated for disassembly. These components 
form the basis for an erLEP approach possible with lower stockpile numbers. The SSP, 
for example, has confirmed long lifetimes in stockpile pits. Through smart choices in 
reusing pits in LEPs, higher margin systems can become a stockpile norm. Smart choices 
of pit reuse can also eliminate many hazardous materials from the stockpile and increase 
the safety of the weapons. An important objective is to evolve the stockpile into 
compliance with the goals of NSPD-28 where "unauthorized use of a US nuclear weapon 
is impossible....”. Recent advances in SSP have identified advanced security technologies 
achievable in erLEPs with relaxed yield-to-weight limits. Provided SSP surety research 
continues, this technology would enable a substantial number of stockpile erLEPs to 
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become high-surety weapons. Use control development leverages and integrates the 
strengths and capabilities of the two nuclear design laboratories. It builds upon 
continuing advances in SSP capabilities.  
The reuse concept is not limited to pits. Even greater benefits can be reaped if reuse 
extends to other tested weapon components. Secondaries do not suffer aging of the sort 
that is of concern in pit aging. Appropriately made secondary parts, vetted in 
surveillance, are available for reuse. Studies have shown reused secondary components, 
with a nuclear-tested pedigree, offer high-confidence alternatives to iLEPs. 
In addition, modern technologies to extend our knowledge of the condition of weapons 
can be seamlessly incorporated into erLEPs. For example, the use of embedded micro-
sensors monitoring a weapon’s health can provide a continuous stream of data on the 
condition of an individual weapon. Imbedded sensors that self identify minimize 
shipping, surveillance disassembly, and destructive evaluations except where the 
weapon’s data stream indicates an actual issue. These sensors, developed by the SSP and 
targeted for RRW, are now mature enough for final testing in weapon assemblies. 
By incorporating micro-sensors into erLEPs, we can increase our confidence in each 
weapon. A small stockpile increases the deterrence value of each individual weapon. 
Thus, the impact of weapons failure increases as the stockpile decreases. Diversity of 
type becomes even more important. Traditional statistically based disassembly 
surveillance becomes unworkable at low numbers. Thus, embedded micro-sensors move 
from a good idea to a necessity. In traditional surveillance, disassembly and inspection 
mandate an increase in stockpile numbers just to have units to inspect. Modern, 
embedded sensor technology minimizes the logistics backup from the stockpile by 
eliminating transport, disassembly, and inspection of healthy units.  
erLEPs combined with “cherry picking” of existing weapons would enable a smaller 
production complex, reducing or even eliminating the need to rebuild some Cold War 
facilities. Reuse eliminates the costly production of many weapon components. Current 
reuse of stockpile pits has dramatically reduced the need for new pit production. 
Essentially pristine secondary components currently in storage represent more than two 
decades of future production in the planned complex. To simply discard these 
components and build new is a huge waste of national resources. Because these 
components exist, we could respond faster to stockpile issues. 
In summary, the future stockpile strategy, when coupled with a weapons complex that 
has a fully proven and mature capability and capacity, should afford the opportunity to 
minimize the reserve stockpile and provide confidence to consider the means to lower 
stockpile numbers.  While RRW represents the “end state” on the continuum, an erLEPed 
approach can serve as the bridge to accelerate a transition and represents significant 
progress toward a safer, more secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Building on its 
successes, the SSP is on the path to build a capability that can provide confident 
certification of reuse weapons or RRWs without nuclear testing or at its logical end—the 
need to rely on a particular past nuclear test result.  Confidence in the future stockpile, 
coupled with a sustainable and agile laboratory and production complex, eliminates 
concern over whether the nation can respond in time to national needs. 
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Capability and Capacity. It is convenient to split discussion of the future status of the 
weapons complex into two parts: capability and capacity. Capability includes the weapon 
design, engineering development, assessment, and certification skills and tools within the 
weapons complex. Largely (but not exclusively) residing at the three NNSA laboratories, 
most of these activities can be thought of as the evolution of “science-based stockpile 
stewardship.” Capacity deals with production—how quickly can weapons be made and 
what special nuclear materials and components are on hand or can be made. 
Capability provides the basis for rebuilding the US nuclear stockpile in response to 
international events or technological surprise. Capacity determines the response rate. 
Capability also provides the essential source of technical input into arms control 
negotiations and implementation, including the development of verification technologies, 
and interpretation of intelligence information. It is essential for effective nuclear 
emergency response and avoidance of technical surprise. Finally, the SSP embodied in 
capability is the only safeguard the nation has to avoid nuclear testing when a weapon 
problem arises. 
What are the long-term scientific and technical capabilities required to sustain, not 
just the stockpile, but the deterrent? Capability: The Science and Technology Base. 
As mentioned above, capability is the only safeguard the nation has from the need to 
resume nuclear testing as issues arises. It is also the nation’s insurance to guard against 
strategic surprise. In many respects, the need for outstanding capability—the ultimate 
objective of SSP—becomes even greater as the size of the stockpile decreases. The lower 
the number of weapons, the more important becomes the performance of each weapon 
type (and at extremely low numbers, each weapon). Through sensor-enabled surveillance 
coupled with advances in computer simulation, SSP is poised to deliver a capability to 
precisely characterize the individual performance of each and every nuclear weapon from 
cradle to grave.  In fact, by maintaining the pace of SSP advances through the next 
decade, stewards will deliver this capability not just for stockpile weapons, but for 
nuclear weapons whose configuration has diverged from those that have been nuclear 
tested. 
Why were nuclear tests conducted? They were conducted to measure a few parameters 
used to set adjustable performance factors in simulation codes. When relevant nuclear 
test data is not available, stockpile stewards rely on basic understanding of the weapons, 
developed through theory, non-nuclear experiments, simulation, and sophisticated 
methods under development to quantify margins to failure and weapon uncertainties 
(QMU). Issues that arise in stockpiled weapons are typically not recurrent problems. 
They are usually unforeseen. Thus, if sustaining the stockpile depends on a previous 
nuclear test of a potential problem, we are hostage to good luck. So far we have been 
lucky (and because of SSP, smart). Stockpile stewards are working to remove design-
dependent adjustable factors in their simulation models for energy balance, boost, and 
secondary performance. To eliminate dependence on the results of any particular nuclear 
test, stewards need to complete these keystone deliverables and have sufficient 
computational capacity for QMU risk analysis. This will enable confident extrapolation 
from experimental test data as weapons age and problems arise. 
A major goal of the stewardship program was the demonstration of an entry-level 
simulation ability through a million-fold increase in computational capability. That was 
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achieved in 2006 with the operation of the ASC Purple machine capable of 100 teraflops 
(1014 operation/sec). To retain international leadership in weapons capability and to 
eliminate reliance on nuclear test benchmarks requires those keystone models combined 
with QMU simulation ensembles. This sets the scale for simulation. It will require 
exaflop (>1018ops/sec) scale computing. Currently our fastest (and the world’s fastest) 
machine is Blue Gene/L at about 0.0005 exaflops. While high-margin systems would be 
less prone to single-point failures than Cold War designs, they are no less in need of this 
capability. There is no technology that eliminates the vagaries of nature or the advance of 
time. 
Exercising the combination of weapon design and development engineering is also 
essential to sustaining the steward’s skill level. The steady development of new systems 
before 1992 maintained the experience of nuclear weapon designers and engineers. It 
provided experience both broad and deep. Such training is a crucial part of nuclear 
weapons stewardship because new employees do not arrive with the required skills. 
Knowledge of the details of nuclear design and engineering is important beyond stockpile 
maintenance; it also underpins the avoidance of technical surprise, development and 
implementation of effective nonproliferation strategies, and negotiation of prudent arms 
control treaties and verification measures. Periodic prototyping of components, 
subassemblies, and complete designs serves to keep capability for weapons development 
sharp and credible. 
The National Ignition Facility is nearing completion. Operating with of 192 laser beams 
in March 2009, it will deliver 60 times more energy than any other high-energy-density 
experimental tool. It will be able to attain the grand challenge goal of laboratory fusion 
ignition, will provide an unprecedented venue for mathematically scaled, non-ignition 
weapons physics experiments, and will provide, for the first time, the ability to conduct 
laboratory experiments in the physics of nuclear weapon thermonuclear processes. While 
a wide range of stewardship’s experimental capabilities are required to resolve the final 
uncertainties surrounding weapons performance, NIF will be at the forefront of 
understanding both fundamental physics and integrated phenomena central to predicting 
weapons performance. The final keystone models of SSP can only be validated at NIF. 
The centrality of fusion burn to boost is self-evident. The leap to a simulation capability 
that frees the nation from ever again requiring nuclear test data is contingent upon the 
understanding gained from NIF experiments conducted at the pressures and temperatures 
arising in a nuclear explosion. NIF is where the capabilities of both primary and 
secondary nuclear weapons designers will be tested. 
The recent success of the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) 
is central to sustaining skills as well as maintaining weapons. DARHT is where primary 
designers are tested. DARHT produces unprecedented high-resolution images from two 
separate views at multiple times of the hydrodynamic behavior of an imploding nuclear 
weapon primary pit. This will give greater confidence in the understanding and accuracy 
of 3-D simulations of weapons performance. Such capability is particularly important to 
answer recent JASON concerns regarding the certification of safety and security 
technologies. 
An unresolved long-term sustainment issue is born of the success of ASC simulation. As 
simulation fidelity increases, the number of experiments needed to verify performance 
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decreases. As this trend continues in a financially constrained program, the enterprise will 
be challenged to sustain large-scale facilities as the experiments in those facilities become 
infrequent. We will have to get our data in a very different way. Production facilities face 
a similar problem if operated far below their base capacity. Ultimately, financial exigency 
will demand a “facility-free” approach because it is the data, not the facility that must be 
sustained. 
The single integrating capability absolutely required for any size deterrent is that of 
human intellectual capital. Recruitment and retention of an expert workforce is a 
substantial challenge, particularly in an environment where the principal deliverable is 
being downsized. In coming years, we will face the retirement of the last of the 
workforce experienced in nuclear testing. In the face of this reality, the laboratories 
continue to hire the best and brightest. These scientists and engineers have, to date, kept 
the laboratories at the leading edge of technology. The workforce must be expert and 
diverse, able to take advantages of the strides made in multidisciplinary science. Working 
with the best simulation and experimental facilities the workforce is inspired and 
empowered to anticipate technological surprise. The workforce engaged specifically in 
nuclear weapons is shrinking as the SSP succeeds. This is not a new trend. The number of 
scientists required to field a weapon in the 1960’s was vastly larger than we need today. 
Simulation enables us to do significantly more with many fewer people. So it is natural 
that numbers will decline, making each individual that much more essential. As SSP 
succeeds, these skills are being brought to bear on a broader suite of national security 
research needs. This broader suite of research will also help to attract and retain the best 
and keep them at work in areas that will give rise to disruptive technological surprise. 
Maintaining the human capability element is usually an unspoken risk, but we believe it 
is the greatest risk to maintenance of a credible deterrent. 
In light of the challenges of the 21st century global security environment and the 
challenges for maintaining the stockpile, we must not starve capability in favor of 
investments in capacity.  Keeping the momentum of SSP capability advances is required 
to maintain the aging stockpile, offering credible future stockpile options, and forms the 
insurance policy against technological surprise.  Without substantial sustained investment 
in SSP capability today that capitalizes on the available expert workforce and investment 
in SSP tools, the country cannot propose to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent with 
small numbers of nuclear weapons. 
What should be the capacity of the production complex? Production Facilities and 
Special Nuclear Materials. To sustain nuclear weapons deterrence we must also 
transform the supporting nuclear weapons R&D and manufacturing infrastructure. In this 
regard, we are continuing to make progress on restoring many capabilities, including 
production of tritium and plutonium pits.  
The best approach to capacity for a small stockpile is a very different model than we have 
today or had during the Cold War. The Cold War stockpile contains a large number 
(about 10) of very exotic, non-commercial processes that make long-term sustainment 
problematic (and so expensive). Further, the block iLEP approach driven by the block 
construction approach of the Cold War means that production rates are not sustained. 
Specifically, a future small stockpile based upon these systems and approach will 
undergo the sort of financial and technical dislocations that the current LEP program is 
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experiencing (i.e., investing to reestablish processes, running them, and shutting them 
down, then recapitalizing them for a smaller run 10 or 20 years later). Elimination of 
many in-house processes by material elimination and/or outsourcing allows transition to 
minimum facilities or even facility-free technologies. This then enables a change to 
sustained, trickle production and so avoids huge demand swings. 
Two important weapon production issues are rate of production and what is produced—
both factors affect the size and design of the production complex. A minimum production 
complex to sustain a reduced-size stockpile would have a one-shift production rate of 
about ~50 weapons per year, such as the planned pit facility at LANL. A capacity sized to 
a small stockpile should entail this model of production. Lower numbers make the 
maintenance of Cold War multiple-technology, big factories problematic. The huge 
brick-and-mortar costs are not commensurate with ~50 weapons per year trickle 
production. This argues for minimum facilities, elimination of special materials wherever 
possible, and facility-free capabilities. This also argues for simplicity of materials, 
assembly, and disassembly. 
Continuous trickle production would be consistent with a stockpile of ~2000 if a 
combination of refurbishment/replacement every twenty years and erLEPs (with perhaps 
RRWs) becomes the norm. A slow, steady production rate mitigates risks that arise from 
start-and-stop batch manufacturing. If you make some weapons and then stop for years, 
problems will arise when you start up again (such is the case in current iLEP production). 
Trickle production, which is the way the United Kingdom and France sustain their 
stockpiles, helps to preserve know-how and skills in the production complex as well as 
minimize facility size. Trickle production with both outsourced and minimized in-house 
facilities also avoids the unintended external perception that a recapitalization project is 
driven by an arms build up. Stability of production for a stable, smaller deterrent 
stockpile enhances the stability of perceptions of that deterrent. 
What you produce is very important; there are significant differences between a future 
stockpile of iLEP’d Cold War weapons or high-margin warheads. While not as 
comprehensive as an RRW approach, erLEP would help eliminate many hard to sustain 
and hazardous materials processes. Fewer components need to be produced because 
nuclear-tested components already exist. While it is likely erLEP weapons are less costly 
to produce than iLEP weapons, they would still require some investment in plutonium 
and highly enriched uranium facilities. The costs of construction, operation, and 
maintenance of these facilities in today’s environment are large and the costs are only 
likely to increase. This argues for improved design technologies to enable reduced 
investment and reduced reliance on traditional approaches to special nuclear material 
manufacture. It also minimizes the long-term costs, environmental impacts, etc. (e.g., 
Rocky Flats, Hanford) that might be incurred. 
If the stockpile is smaller and the US takes the constrained approach to production 
proposed here, reconstitution of large stockpile sizes or variations in design would be 
enabled by basic sets of skills, tools, established processes, and an experience base in an 
optimized, effective complex. Should the world become a more troubled place, a strategy 
of modular expansion of minimum facilities could address increased needs. Building on 
concurrent engineering and advanced prototyping methods, the time to go from design to 
production could be revolutionized. A streamlined design-to-production process would 
  11 
increase confidence in the responsiveness of the capability-capacity link thereby allowing 
a smaller stockpile and cutting weapons acquisition costs in the near term. This process 
and the potential for modularization of production would provide readiness required to 
respond to national security threats in a time of national need. 
A capable production complex offers decision makers a variety of choices regarding the 
size and make-up for the stockpile. For instance, one can envision a small stockpile of 
high-margin, high-surety warheads augmented by a production complex able to respond 
quickly to an emerging threat. Establishing confidence in both the capability to diagnose 
and address weapons performance issues and confidence in the timely ability to produce 
required weapons, would eliminate the need for the reserve stockpile. While there is a 
limit to the number of high-surety warheads that could be immediately produced via pit 
reuse, future decision makers may opt for that stockpile size, or trickle production could 
eventually eliminate the problem. Such a decision would better assure the safety and 
security of the stockpile and reduce the size of the infrastructure required for new pit 
production, among other things. In a time of national need, additional warheads could be 
built from modularized expansion of the facilities described above, or alternatively, very 
quickly assembled from reuse materials and components, unsuitable for the high-surety 
stockpile. With confidence in the capability to rapidly design to the threat, the DoD could 
have weapons beyond those in the enduring stockpile tailored to meet future threats, and 
the US could maintain very small stockpile numbers. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Peace is the paramount goal. To maintain our deterrent and the nuclear umbrella, the US 
must maintain vital technical capabilities; capabilities that can be brought to bear quickly 
to meet any challenge. First and foremost, under any stockpile size, we must maintain 
essential human capital and provide them with forefront capabilities and have right-sized 
responsive, production capacity. The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to be 
hugely successful. Coupled with the right complex, SSP can sustain a credible nuclear 
deterrent. A framework for the enduring deterrent has not yet been defined, nor the 
stockpile to fit that framework. The Congressional Commission on US Strategic Posture 
and the upcoming Posture Review should help define that framework. However, we must 
not let the lack of a framework cause stewardship to stall nor workforce skills to atrophy. 
It would also be irresponsible to make major investments in recreating a Cold War 
complex before the country decides upon the proper framework. The stewardship 
program has brought forth innovative solutions to maintaining the deterrent and 
optimizing investments. We have an unprecedented opportunity to consider alternate 
approaches; to use existing stockpile resources to manage the stockpile while we make 
transformational decisions. Continuing to invest in capability for the deterrent broadens 
the solution options the country can draw for in the future. By deciding now to sustain 
investments in capability we can secure a much smaller, science-based stockpile with 
enhanced security and safety that is sustained by a responsive, right-sized production 
complex. 
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